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Cut in Aid Funds Threatens Balanced Security Policy

WASHINGTON—To Congress spring means not so much the singing of the birds and the budding of the leaves as the time when it must consider the appropriations bills that sustain the Federal government. In this respect the spring of 1950 is unlike many that went before it. Whereas members of the House and Senate usually insist that the President and his executive agencies get along with less than he deems necessary for their efficient operation, this year finds Congress uncertain whether President Truman has not requested too little for the already most costly single institution within the executive branch—the Department of Defense.

Military and Point Four

The appropriations problem involves not so much the issue of economy versus extravagance as the question whether the country should seek security in a formidable military establishment of its own or in a moderate military program coupled with economic and social programs designed to stabilize friendly nations. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, former Chief of Staff, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson have recently counseled Congress that it can best safeguard the country from danger abroad by balancing reliance on arms with reliance on economic undertakings. When General Eisenhower recommended to the House Appropriations Committee on March 29 that it increase the defense budget by \$500 million, he said that the United States should also advance its cause by nonmilitary means, since it is "futile" to defend the country through arms alone. But while Congress contemplates increases

in the military budget, it has been throwing the country's over-all security policy out of balance by reducing the sums President Truman requested for the nonmilitary phases of our foreign policy.

In reporting the military appropriations bill for the year commencing next July 1, the House Appropriations Committee on March 21 said that "there is ample warrant for a number of increases in the budget to more adequately prepare this country for an emergency, but increases have not been made because of the necessity for economy and financial stability. Undoubtedly we are taking very grave risks in not being better prepared."

The committee closely followed the President's budget in recommending what Congress appropriate for the military—\$13,911,127,300 in all, divided between \$12,825,342,300 in cash and \$1,085,785,000 in contract authority—but noted with dissatisfaction that President Truman had declined to spend part of the funds appropriated last year for the express purpose of maintaining an Air Force of fifty-eight groups. It predicted that the funds requested for 1950-51 would finance an Air Force of only forty-two groups instead of the forty-eight which the President's budget contemplates. In his testimony to the committee on March 29, General Eisenhower recommended that the country maintain a forty-eight group force with modern equipment, improve the defense of Alaskan air bases, and obtain adequate anti-submarine forces. He favored a ceiling of \$15 billion on military spending.

No committee or member of Congress has recommended increases in appropria-

tions or authorizations for foreign economic programs. On the contrary, the House on March 31 reduced from \$45 million to \$25 million the amount requested by the Administration for the inauguration of the Point Four program. The previous day, after conferences with Secretary Acheson and Philip C. Jessup (who has been raised from ambassador-at-large to the new position of chief political adviser to the Secretary), Chairman Tom Connally of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee criticized the Administration's intention to assign a portion of the Point Four funds to United Nations agencies for administration. The State Department has counted on the aid of the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization to help carry out the program.

Balanced Security Program

The House also reduced by \$250 million the amount which the Administration had requested for the Economic Cooperation Administration, although the Democratic leadership persuaded the House to delete an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which would have denied assistance to Britain as long as the six counties of Northern Ireland remained outside the Irish Republic and another amendment which would have required the ECA to take from government stocks of farm surpluses \$1 billion worth of the goods to be distributed under the Marshall Plan in 1950-51. On March 31, however, the House did insert an amendment earmarking \$750 million of ECA aid for the purchase of farm products, leaving it up to the ECA to decide whether the money

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should be spent in the United States or elsewhere.

In reducing the amount of foreign aid, the House ignored appeals both from President Truman and from Secretary Acheson to authorize the full \$45 million which the Administration sought for Point Four. Speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 30, Mr. Acheson said that countries in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America have been pinning great hopes on Point Four. He remarked that it "is not and never will be a big money program." He supported the comments Mr. Jessup had

made to the committee on the previous day, recommending that the United States increase its help to Asia through a program of small arms and economic assistance, especially to Indo-China. At the same time General Eisenhower was testifying to the House Appropriations Committee that if the United States overspent on military programs, it could not "fail to be playing into the hands of the enemy." The General also said that "the world cannot carry a great and burdensome armament forever without developing an acute situation."

Yet the tendency of Congress to build up the military while it reduces foreign economic programs may remain manifest as long as the Administration itself fails to submit military and foreign policy programs in balanced relation to one another. A strengthening of the National Security Council, as suggested by Bernard Baruch on March 31, might make a balanced presentation possible inasmuch as it would certainly encourage the State and Defense departments to work out their policies in greater cooperation than is now the case.

BLAIR BOLLES

Long View Needed in Assessing Cold War

The shock caused here by Communist victories in China and the emotions engendered by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's attacks on the Department of State have caused many people, even among those in a position of leadership, to succumb to defeatism. They feel that "we have lost the cold war" or can hope to win it only if we resort to some of the totalitarian methods we have denounced when used by the Germans or the Russians.

Negotiations Are Not War

What, actually, is the score? Have we reason to despair, or may we still nurture modest hopes for the future?

In arriving at an estimate it is important to bear in mind that negotiations between nations, even if conducted in the most acid terms, are not comparable to a "shooting" war, and still less to bargaining in a business deal. The term "cold war," graphic though it may be in describing a situation which can be redefined more accurately as "no war, no peace," has encouraged the erroneous idea that "our side" must register continuous clear-cut "victories"—otherwise our opponent will be victorious, and we shall suffer "defeat."

Since a primary objective of a shooting war is to end the destruction it wreaks as soon as possible, time becomes of the essence, and every day in which no ground is won from the "enemy" is considered as lost. When the opposing forces have finally been routed, dispersed or decimated, the war is considered won, and the "enemy" is expected to offer unconditional surrender. There are thus concrete ways of measuring the course of the war; and there is always in sight a terminal point at which the victor expects, usually quite mistakenly, to revert to pre-war conditions,

by then nostalgically recalled as a state of "normalcy."

Obviously no such yardsticks of achievement, no such terminal points, exist or can be expected to exist in international negotiations. What one has to expect is not a sharp alternation of victories and defeats, no definitive engagements of vast scope and decisive import. Instead there are gradual, sometimes imperceptible, adjustments and readjustments, a little progress here and some backing down there. There may even be complete suspension of efforts to reach a settlement that at a given point seems unattainable, and later a new effort—perhaps years later—this time successful, to transmute into treaty form a change that has meanwhile occurred in the relations between two or more nations.

This is the way European diplomats used to work—without fanfare, without expectation that a conference would alter the tide of human events or reform mankind from top to bottom. The United States has only recently become involved to the hilt in world affairs. Our system of popular democracy, moreover, makes it imperative for our citizens, who are expected to reach at least general decisions on foreign policy, to become acquainted overnight with the thousand and one intricate details of relations between nations which until recently had been a closed book to most of us. By contrast, in other great nations, even those which have democratic systems, diplomacy was traditionally conducted by ruling groups which did not have to obtain popular support for their policies.

Nor can we hope to rush matters by acting as if international affairs could be settled like a business deal: "We give you x dollars, and you deliver whatever it is

we want"—European integration, German union with Western Europe, cessation of communism in Asia, democracy and private enterprise in backward areas. Things simply cannot be done that way; or, rather, they can be done that way but only on one condition—that we are willing and able to enforce our will on other nations by methods comparable to those we have rejected when applied by the Germans and Russians. "Total diplomacy" presumably is not intended to be "totalitarian diplomacy."

Counting Up the Score

Given the limitations both of the process of international negotiations and of our constitutional structure, under which conflict on foreign policy between the executive and the legislature frequently occurs, the United States has reason to congratulate itself on what it has thus far achieved since 1945. We have accepted—although not without many setbacks of which the McCarthy campaign is one aspect—the idea that this country cannot insulate itself from the rest of the world—that the strength we possess entails responsibilities which we must exercise if we are not to find ourselves shorn of power. We have just begun to realize that a nation can only sell more to other countries than it purchases from them if it is willing either to lend them the funds to finance its excess of exports or—and this is even less appealing as a long-term prospect—if it is prepared to give its surpluses away. We now sense, although still dimly, that the poverty of other peoples as compared with our own well-being may not be due to laziness or wilfulness on their part—or original sin, or incomprehensible reluctance to accept our way of life—but to a wide range of

circumstances. We may help them to remedy these circumstances, with a modest Point Four program, but the process is likely to be one of give and take over a long period of years. We can legitimately feel proud of the impetus Marshall Plan aid has given to European recovery—although we are becoming aware that mere attainment of pre-war production figures will not solve the many problems crying out for reform which provide ready material for Communist propaganda. We are on the verge of realizing that some of our so-called defeats—notably in China—were not inflicted on us by Russia except in an indirect way but were the result of long-term forces which we might possibly have been able to influence better than we did, but only provided we had understood them better.

The urgent need to understand our-

selves and our objectives more clearly is the crux of the present crisis in United States foreign policy. Self-criticism and soul-searching are eminently healthy—provided they are based on knowledge and not on blind lashing out at trumped-up scapegoats. American experts on China, for example, are accused of being Soviet agents or stooges of the Communist party because they warned us what to expect: *ergo*, they—not Chiang Kai-shek—were responsible for the defeat of the Nationalists. This attitude is dangerously reminiscent of Senator William E. Borah's assertion on the eve of World War II that he did not expect war—he had his "own sources of information."

Underneath some of the current accusations one detects a deep-seated reluctance to hear unpleasant things, to face unpleasant situations. Foreign observers—among

them Aldous Huxley and Evelyn Waugh—have commented with surprise on our elaborate efforts to avoid contact with death and on our craving always to find a "happy ending." If we are to act as a mature nation, we shall have to look many disheartening situations straight in the eye, without faltering and without taking refuge in the allegation that if only "someone" had done "something" all this would not have happened. We will have to discover a course that seeks neither blind concurrence with all the aims of our adversaries or competitors nor destructive showdowns. We must learn to negotiate, no matter how slowly, without expecting victories every day and without jumping to the conclusion that such setbacks as we experience necessarily represent unadulterated triumphs for the Kremlin.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Khama Case Becomes Focus for African Tensions

The case of Seretse Khama, the African chieftain who married a London typist, is deeply significant to most of Africa south of the Sahara. While the British government on March 6 banned Mr. Khama from returning to Bechuanaland to take up duties as chief of the Bamangwato tribes on grounds relevant to his competence as leader of his people, the issues go far beyond the geographic confines of the territory in question. Also involved in this delicate problem of tribal dynasty and mixed marriage are the future of the three British protectorates contiguous to the Union of South Africa, race relations within the Union and the pattern of politics in the British possessions running up the eastern spine of Africa.

Desert Dynasty

Bechuanaland, the northernmost of the three protectorates, is the largest—larger than Texas—and also poorer than the other two, Basutoland and Swaziland. Bechuanaland's population is about 300,000, of which 100,000 owe allegiance to the Bamangwato chiefs. The Kalahari desert stretches across the protectorate, making it an arid prize for African and European alike. The Khama family's rule of the Bamangwato tribe antedates Britain's annexation of Bechuanaland in 1885.

In recent years Tshekedi Khama, Seretse's uncle, has served as regent while the young chief-designate was in England studying law to prepare himself for his duties. Seretse's marriage was contracted

in September 1948 against the advice of his uncle, and a tribal meeting in January 1949 gave the younger Khama the choice of giving up either his chieftainship or his wife. When he refused to accept this verdict, a second meeting overwhelmingly voted for his return with his wife. This decision, however, sent Tshekedi and forty other tribal leaders into voluntary exile, and Britain, as administering power, appointed a commission of inquiry.

Although the commission's report was not made public, it was the basis for the government's decision to exile both Seretse and Tshekedi for five years, after which the question was to be reviewed. A White Paper issued on March 22 declared that Seretse, by marrying against tribal advice, "showed himself unmindful of the interests of his tribe and his public duty." It also expressed "serious doubts" that he could retain support in the face of a possible family feud and the uncertainty as to how his people would regard the children of the marriage.

The British ban was announced during Seretse's stay in London at the invitation of the Commonwealth Office. It had the effect of forbidding his return to his wife in Bechuanaland, although the government offered to bring her to London. The chief contended he had been "tricked," and the government, while denying any such maneuver, subsequently allowed him to return to the protectorate until the birth of the couple's child, expected in June.

These events constitute only the bare

bones of the controversy. In the background is the threatened bid of South Africa to replace Britain as the ruler of the three protectorates, already economically linked with the dominion. Last October Dr. Daniel F. Malan, Nationalist Prime Minister, declared at a political meeting at Bloemfontein that he was preparing to make representations to Britain for the incorporation of the three territories into the Union of South Africa, thus renewing a demand which has been frequently presented by various South African governments for the last thirty years. The position of the protectorates was defined in the South Africa Act of 1909, which granted the dominion self-government. A schedule attached to the act outlined a method by which the three territories might eventually be transferred to South Africa. It was made clear at the time, and reaffirmed by the British government in 1935 when the question was re-examined, that no transfer would take place without consultation with the affected peoples. The African population of the protectorates have never shown enthusiasm for a merger with the Union, and Dr. Malan's latest bid was met with renewed protests from the territories.

Yet the South African argument that the present situation constitutes an infringement of the dominion's sovereignty gets some sympathetic, if not decisive, response in London. Basutoland is entirely surrounded by the Union, Swaziland is nearly surrounded, and Bechuanaland's

longest border is with Southwest Africa, the controversial mandate which the Union holds. Moreover, the administration of the Union's own native reserves compares favorably on certain materialistic grounds with British rule in the protectorates. But so long as the Nationalist government's policy of segregation aggravates racial tension in the dominion—as manifested by 1949 riots in Durban and the recurrent disorders around Johannesburg in 1949 and 1950—British surrender of responsibility is so unlikely that Dr. Malan has not pressed his claim officially.

With these considerations in mind some British opinion has regarded the Commonwealth Office's action favorably, arguing in the words of the *Manchester Guardian* that the sacrifice of Seretse is justifiable "in order to defend the better all the Bantu peoples of the protectorates." The *Guardian* pointed out that Seretse is "not the first man to find that a ruler cannot always marry as freely as a private citizen." Others, including members of the Labor party, have charged that the Labor government is making South Africa's native policy its own.

A Head-On Clash?

The most disquieting aspect of the case is the accumulating evidence that a head-on clash between Dr. Malan's movements to preserve "the white line in Africa"—a rallying cry getting some sympathetic attention in Kenya and the Rhodesias—and African nationalism is not far distant. The British government, so far a buffer between the two forces, may some day find the pressure too great. While nationalism in West Africa, where European settlers are few, has been relatively peaceful and has brought Nigeria and the Gold Coast close to self-government, East and Central Africa represent an explosive situation created by the presence of large white communities. Last April a demonstration of the Bataka party in Uganda—once regarded as a model of British indirect rule—was led by Semakula Mulumba, a new figure in African politics, and was promptly branded as Communist-inspired by the British governor, Sir John Hall. Today Mulumba is in London as Secretary General of the African League and is a leader in the protest movement against the Seretse Khama decision.

WILLIAM W. WADE

News in the Making

GRAY'S DIFFICULT TASK: Washington's concern about post-1952 international economic relations is indicated by President Truman's appointment on April 2 of Gordon Gray, retiring Secretary of the Army, as Special Assistant to the President in charge of a cabinet committee which will formulate plans and policies to alleviate the dollar shortage. The difficult nature of Mr. Gray's task is emphasized by France's fear, expressed in a dispatch to the *New York Times* of April 3, that there is not much prospect of substantially increasing French exports to the United States. French pessimism is ascribed to American tariffs, the luxury quality of potential French exports and American and European competition.

LABOR AND TAXES IN BRITAIN: The next test for the British Labor government, now holding power with a Commons majority of a handful of seats, will come on April 18 when Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Stafford Cripps delivers his budget address. The Chancellor is under pressure from both the trade unions and the business community to lower taxes. While he is likely to keep the budget balanced, considerable changes in Britain's tax structure may be in the offing.

INDIAN-PAKISTANI SETTLEMENT?: Hopes for some improvement in relations between India and Pakistan which, according to Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup, threaten stability in Southern Asia were renewed as the Prime Ministers of the two new countries opened important conversations in New Delhi on April 2. Communal rioting in Bengal and the Kashmir question are key problems.

A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT?: The invitation extended by the Committee of Ministers of the European Council on April 1 to Western Germany and the Saar to join the Consultative Assembly was countered by Dr. Konrad Adenauer, German Chancellor, on April 2 when he declared that the only means of preventing Europe's annihilation in another war is the formation of a continental parliament with real authority of which Germany would be a member.

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

*ST. LOUIS, April 10, *The Struggle for Germany*, Evarts Graham, Jr.

*NEW YORK, April 11, *The Problem of Underdeveloped Areas*, George C. McGhee

*BOSTON, April 12, *The McMahon Proposals—The Road to Peace*, William Yandell Elliott

*POUGHKEEPSIE, April 12, *How American Policy Is Formulated*, Joseph Johnson

*BETHLEHEM, April 18, *The International Trade Organization*, Clair Wilcox

*CLEVELAND, April 18, *Focus on the Far East*, Dwight Griswold

*PITTSBURGH, April 19, *U.S. Strategy in the Cold War*, James B. Reston

*PHILADELPHIA, April 20, *The Foreign Trade Gap*, Paul G. Hoffman, Curtis E. Calder, Geoffrey S. Smith

*Data taken from printed announcement.

Eastern Europe's Economy

What are the real economic conditions in Eastern Europe? Are post-war industrial plans being fulfilled? What is the present status of agricultural collectivization? For facts—not official claims or newspaper scare stories—READ:

INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE IN
EASTERN EUROPE:

Part I, *Industry*, and Part II, *Agriculture*,
by Samuel L. Sharp and Laure Metzger
March 15 and April 1 issues

Foreign Policy Reports—25¢

Subscription \$5; to FPA members, \$4

Political Handbook of the World, edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York, Harper & Bros. for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1950. \$3.50.

The twenty-third annual edition of a compact and authoritative volume which gives the composition of the governments of all the countries of the world, as well as useful facts about political parties, their leaders and the foreign press. It also includes a special section on the United Nations.

Information Please Almanac 1950, edited by John Kiernan. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1949. \$2.50.

A handy source of reference in which a considerable portion is devoted to a compact collection of data on the nations of the world. The 1950 edition includes for the first time brief articles to guide vacationers in Britain, France, Italy and Scandinavia, written respectively by Christopher Morley, Louis Bromfield, John Gunther and Russel Crouse.

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